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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FIRST AMENDMENT-A "RA­
TIONAL INTERPRETATION" OF Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc. 
INTRODUCTION 
The first amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law 
... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." 1 While freedom 
of speech and of the press are guaranteed to all persons under the first 
amendment, these rights are not absolute.2 Although an active press is 
"an indispensable component of a free and democratic society,"3 this 
value must be balanced against an individual's interest in maintaining 
his or her privacy or reputation.4 In a libel action, these competing 
interests come into conflict. s 
While the majority of libel actions result from untrue statements 
of fact, this conflict also arises in the context of quotations. When 
quotation marks are used by a journalist, most readers understand that 
they represent the speaker's actual words. Therefore, the use of quota­
tion marks has not presented many problems for courts to resolve. 
However, quotations present a special problem in the determination of 
1. u.s. CoNST. amend. I. The first amendment provides in its entirety: "Congress 
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people 
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." Id. 
2. In fact, at one time libelous speech was among "limited classes of speech, the 
prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional 
problem." Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942). Conversely, Jus­
tice Black proposed the idea, which has never commanded the support of a majority of the 
Court, that the literal language of the first amendment should be given effect. By taking the 
words "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech or of the press" 
and interpreting "no law" strictly to require absolute protection of speech, Justice Black's 
view completely eliminates the law of libel. L. ELDREDGE, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION 
§§ 48-49, at 244-47 (1978); R. LABUNSKI, LIBEL AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 38 (1963); 
see also Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation o/the First Amend­
ment, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1, 4 (1965). . 
3. Schermerhorn v. Rosenberg, 73 A.D.2d 276, 282-83, 426 N.Y.S.2d 274, 280 
(1980). 
4. This interest "reflects no more than our basic concept of the essential dignity and 
worth of every human being-a concept at the root of any decent system of ordered lib­
erty." Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
5. Upon analysis of the conflict between the law of libel and the first amendment, the 
Court has stated that "[slome tension necessarily exists between the need for a vigorous and 
uninhibited press and the legitimate interest in redressing wrongful injury." Gertz v. Rob­
ert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974). 
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liability in a libel action where a plaintiff claims that his or her own 
words were deliberately altered. 
"The author's job is not simply to copy statements verbatim;"6 
inherent in the nature of reporting is the responsibility to interpret and 
rework the statements into an article. 7 When the author paraphrases a 
speaker's remarks, readers understand that they are reading the au­
thor's interpretation of what was spoken. The question that remains 
for the courts is whether a reporter should be given protection under 
the first amendment to change a speaker's verbatim words, and then to 
place that altered version within quotations. 8 
Recently, in Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc.,9 the Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit addressed a unique question involving 
the appropriate approach to the actual malice standard in the context 
of a misquotation. In a 2-1 decision, the court held that actual malice 
could not be inferred from altered statements placed within quotations 
as long as the purported quotes approximated what was said, or could 
be seen as a rational interpretation of ambiguous remarks. to 
This Note examines the rationale and impact of the Masson deci­
sion, and addresses whether a court can infer that a reporter acted 
with actual malice when evidence shows that statements placed in 
quotation marks were altered or fabricated deliberately. Section I 
briefly discusses the history and purposes of libel law, and examines 
the policies behind placing constitutional limitations on libel law 
through New York Times v. Sullivan 11 and its progeny. Section II de­
scribes the Masson decision. Section III contains a critical analysis of 
the Masson decision, and suggests that the rational interpretation stan­
dard the court imposed was improper and inconsistent with the princi­
ples of both libel and first amendment law. 
6. Strada v. Connecticut Newspapers, 193 Conn. 313, 320, 477 A.2d 1005, 1009 
(1984). 
7. Ryan v. Brooks, 634 F.2d 726, 733 (4th Cir. 1980). 
8. "The misquotation problem is a particularly important one when the story in­
volves the assembling and editing of a substantial amount of quoted material." R. 
SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 4.07[5], at 4-31 (1986); see Ben-Oliel v. Press Publishing 
Co., 251 N.Y. 250, 255, 167 N.B. 432, 433-34 (1929) ("In order to constitute a libel, it is 
not necessary for the defendant ... to directly attack the plaintiff .... The same result is 
accomplished by putting in her mouth or attaching to her pen words which make self­
revelation of such a fact. "). 
9. 895 F.2d 1535 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. granted, III S. Ct. 39 (1990). 
10. Id. at 1539. 
11. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
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I. BACKGROUND 
A. History and Purposes ofLibel Law 
According to Dean Prosser, defamation consists of two torts, libel 
and slander.12 The distinction between the two is that libel refers to 
defamatory words that are written or printed while slander refers to 
the oral communication of defamatory statements. 13 A defamatory 
statement is one which harms the reputation of another. 14 
The tort of libel has undergone significant changes since its origin. 
This is due in part to the fact that the law of libel reflects an attempt to 
accommodate two important yet conflicting interests: the integrity of 
an individual's reputation, and the responsibility of the press to inform 
citizens on matters of public concern. IS In order to understand fully 
the significance of the Masson decision to the press and public, it is 
necessary to look briefly at the history of libel which reflects the ten­
sion between these two values. 16 
In his treatise on tort law, Dean Prosser characterized defamation 
as an "oddity of tort law" that developed according to no particular 
plan,17 At common law, libel was a strict liability tort. 18 A defendant 
could be found liable for publishing a false and defamatory statement 
12. W. KEETON, D. DoBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON 
THE LAW OF TORTS § Ill, at 771 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER ON TORTS]. 
13. 	 Id. 
14. A defamatory statement can be defined as a communication which tends "to 
harm the reputation of another as to lower him [or her] in the estimate of the community 
or to deter third persons from associating with him [or her]." REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 559 (1965). 
IS. Ashdown, Gertz and Firestone: A Study in Constitutional Policy-making, 61 
MINN. L. REv. 645, 645-46 (1977); see also Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 
(1967). In Curtis, Justice Harlan stated, "some antithesis between freedom of speech and 
press and libel actions persists, for libel remains premised on the content of speech and 
limits the freedom of the publisher to express certain sentiments, at least without guaran­
teeing legal proof of their substantial accuracy." Id. at 152. 
16. For a discussion of the history of libel, see Donnelly, History ofDefamation, 1949 
WIS. L. REv. 99; Veeder, The History and Theory of the Law ofDefamation, 4 CoLUM. L. 
REv. 33 (1904). 
17. 	 PROSSER ON TORTS, supra note 12, § 111, at 772. Dean Prosser stated: 
It must be confessed ... that there is a great deal of the law of defamation 
which makes no sense. It contains anomalies and absurdities for which no legal 
writer ever has had a kind word, and it is a curious compound of a strict liability 
imposed upon innocent defendants ... with a blind and almost perverse refusal to 
compensate the plaintiff for real and very serious harm. 
Id. at 771-72 (footnote omitted); see also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 
(1974) ("The common law of defamation is an oddity of tort law, for it allows recovery of 
purportedly compensatory damages without evidence of actual loss."). 
18. 2 F. HARPER, F. JAMES & O. GRAY, THE LAW OF TORTS § 5.0, at 3 (1986). 
Dean Prosser, while discussing the common law of defamation stated: 
130 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13:127 
without any showing that the defendant acted unreasonably, or knew 
or suspected that the statement was false. 19 
The focus of the common law of libel was the protection of one's 
good name and reputation in the community. The tradition of afford­
ing a person the opportunity to vindicate his or her good name is evi­
dent in modem defamation law, which has as its primary purpose the 
protection of the plaintiff's reputation. 20 
A second purpose of defamation law is compensation for harm 
actually caused by the false statement.21 A plaintiff often brings an 
action for defamation for two purposes: to obtain both compensation 
for the injury and public vindication of his or her reputation.22 Addi­
tionally, a successful defamation action serves a deterrent function, 
namely, to punish a defendant who has acted outrageously, and 
thereby deters others from publishing false statements.23 Although 
each jurisdiction has its own rules governing the law of libel, each ap­
proach reflects the public policy of protecting individual reputations 
from false and defamatory speech.24 
The effect of ... strict liability is to place the printed, written or spoken word 
in the same class with the use of explosives or the keeping of dangerous animals. 
If a defamatory meaning, which is false, is reasonably understood, the defendant 
publishes at his peril, and there is no possible defense except the ... narrow one of 
privilege. 
W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, § 113, at 773 (4th ed. 1971). 
19. Lord Mansfield's statement that "whenever a man publishes he publishes at his 
peril" reflects the general attitude of the common law regarding defamatory remarks. See 
The King v. Woodfall, 98 Eng. Rep. 914, 916 (K.B. 1774). 
20. L. ELDREDGE, supra note 2, § 3, at 4. Modern defamation law is concerned with 
protecting people from a wrongful disruption of the" 'relational interest' that an individual 
has in maintaining personal esteem in the eyes of others." R. SMOLLA, supra note 8, 
§ 1.06[1], at 1-15. Defamation law assumes that a person is entitled to have his or her 
standing in the community unimpaired by defamatory statements. One scholar noted that 
there are three separate concepts of reputation that the common law of libel sought to 
protect: "reputation as property, as honor, and as dignity." Post, The Social Foundations 
ofDefamation Law: Reputation and the Constitution, 74 CALIF. L. REv. 691,693 (1986). 
21. L. ELDREDGE, supra nete 2, § 3, at 5; see also Eaton, The American Law of 
Defamation Through Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. and Beyond: An Analytical Primer, 61 
VA. L. REv. 1349, 1357-58 (1975); Smolla, Dun & Bradstreet, Hepps, and Liberty Lobby: 
A New Analytic Primer on the Future Course ofDefamation, 75 GEO. L.J. 1519 (1987). 
22. L. ELDREDGE, supra note 2, § 3, at 6. 
23. Id. The tort of libel has several purposes, including: (1) to compensate for ec0­
nomic injury such as lost employment or dintinished business, (2) to deter the publication 
of false and injurious speech, and (3) to provide a check and balance on the media's actions 
by opening up the media's news-gathering and decision-making processes to public scrutiny 
and accountability. R. SMOLLA, supra note 8, § 1.06. 
24. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring); see also 
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341-42 (1974) (recognizing the legitimate state 
interest of protecting reputation). 
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B. Constitutional Limitations Imposed Upon Libel Law 
Competing against the value of protecting reputational interests is 
the value society places on free speech.2s However, prior to 1964, the 
first amendment did not impose restrictions on the law of defamation. 
The Supreme Court had made it clear that the constitutional protec­
tion for freedom of speech did not include protection for libelous 
utterance.26 
In 1964, in what has been hailed a "landmark decision," the 
United States Supreme Court first applied the limitations of the first 
amendment to the law of libe}.27 In New York Times v. Sullivan,28 the 
Court defined a zone of constitutional protection within which a jour­
nalist can publish information without liability under state libel law. 
The Court recognized the need to strike a balance between reputa­
tional interests and the first amendment freedom of the press.29 
Although false statements of fact are not automatically protected by 
the first amendment, the Court was concerned that holding the press 
liable for a minor mistake of fact might deter reporting of truthful 
information due to the fear and expense of litigation.30 The Supreme 
25. For a discussion of the first amendment, see M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREE­
DOM OF SPEECH § 2.05(C)(1) (1984) (stating "[t]he evil of defamation is self-evident, and 
tort protection here requires no greater theoretical justification than does tort protection 
against assault and battery, and other attacks upon the person"). 
26. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 482-83 (1957) ("[L]ibelous utterances are 
not within the area of constitutionally protected speech."); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 
315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (Libelous speech is among the "funited classes of speech, the 
prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional 
problem."). 
27. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). This decision has been 
highly praised. In fact, one scholar noted that New York Times was "an occasion for danc­
ing in the streets." Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning 
0/ the First Amendment", 1964 SUP. Cr. REv. 191, 221 n.125 (quoting Professor 
Meiklejohn). Kalven described the New York Times decision as one that "may prove to be 
the best and most important [the Court] has ever produced in the realm of freedom of 
speech." Id. at 193-94. 
28. 376 U.S. 254. 
29. Id. at 256. In SulliWJn, the New York Times ran a full page advertisement sup­
porting Dr. Martin Luther King's efforts in the struggle for racial equality. Id. The action 
stemmed from an allegedly libelous advertisement entitled "Heed Their Rising Voices," 
which praised the efforts of Southern Blacks in resisting racism. Id. The advertisement 
contained a number of inaccuracies. One of the inaccuracies included a claim that a large 
number of police officers "rang" the campus of the Alabama State College Campus in 
Montgomery, when in fact they were just present near the campus. Id. at 259. In addition, 
while the State Board of Education expelled nine students, they were not expelled for lead­
ing the demonstration, but for demanding service at the lunch counter in the Montgomery 
County Courthouse on another day. Id. Finally, Dr. King had been arrested on four pre­
vious occasions, not seven times as reported in the advertisement. Id. 
30. Id. at 279. Additionally, courts have given reporters procedural protection in a 
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Court stated that erroneous statements are "inevitable in free debate, 
and ... must be protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the 
'breathing space' that they 'need ... to survive.' "31 
The standard enunciated in New York Times precludes a public 
official from recovery for a defamatory statement criticizing his or her 
official conduct "unless he [or she] proves that the statement was made 
with 'actual malice'-that is, with knowledge that it was false or with 
reckless disregard of whether it was false or not."32 A plaintiff may 
establish actual malice in one of two ways: by proving that the defend­
ant had knowledge of the falsity of the statement, or by demonstrating 
that the defendant published the statement with reckless disregard for 
its truth. The actual malice standard focuses on the conduct and state 
of mind of the journalist at the time of the publication. 
In a series of subsequent cases, the United States Supreme Court 
further defined and expanded the application of the actual malice stan­
dard. The Court extended the actual malice test to public figures as 
well as public officials in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts,33 and the com­
libel action through the use of summary judgment. A summary judgment proceeding has 
been viewed as particularly important in a libel action and considered "the best procedural 
protection" for first amendment rights. MacGuire v. Harriscope Broadcasting Co., 612 
P.2d 830, 831 (Wyo. 1980). The courts are concerned that unfounded libel suits chill free 
speech. The threat of a lawsuit may be just as chilling to the exercise of the first amend­
ment as the fear of the outcome itself. R. SMOLLA, supra note 8, § 12.07[1][b]. Proof 
problems in court and the expense of litigation could turn journalists into self-censors and 
deprive readers and viewers of access to vital information. Thus, granting the journalist the 
extra procedural protection of summary judgment avoids some of the difficulties that a 
journalist is faced with, such as self-censorship. Id. 
For a discussion of the summary judgment proceeding in a libel case, see generally B. 
SANFORD, LIBEL AND PRIVACY, THE PREVENTION AND DEFENSE OF LmGATION 520-30 
(1985); Matheson, Procedure in Public Person Defamation Cases: The Impact of the First 
Amendment, 66 TEX. L. REv. 215, 285-99 (1987); Smolla, supra note 21. 
31. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 271-72 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 
433 (1963». For a discussion of the "chilling effect," see generally Schauer, Fear, Risk and 
the First Amendment: Unraveling the "Chilling Effect", 58 B.U.L. REV. 685 (1978); Note, 
The Chilling Effect in Constitutional Law, 69 CoLUM. L. REV. 808 (1969). 
32. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80. The actual malice standard of New York 
Times has survived twenty-five years of exacting scrutiny, but there are many critics of this 
standard. See generally Del Russo, Freedom of the Press and Defamation: Attacking the 
Bastion of New York Times v. Sullivan, 25 ST. LoUIS U.L.J. 501 (1981); LeBel, Defama­
tion and the First Amendment: The End of the Affair, 25 WM. & MARY L. REv. 779, 788­
89 (1984); Lewis, New York Times v. Sullivan Reconsidered: Time to Return to "The 
Central Meaning ofthe First Amendment", 83 COLUM. L. REV. 603, 623-25 (1983); Smolla, 
Let the Author Beware: The Rejuvenation of the American Law of Libel. 132 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1, 11-12 (1983); Yasser, Defamation as a Constitutional Tort: With Actual Malice for 
All, 12 TULSA L.J. 601 (1977). 
33. 388 U.S. 130 (1967). 
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panion case of Associated Press v. Walker.34 Later, in Gertz v. Robert 
Welch, Inc., 3S the Court differentiated between the level of scienter 
necessary in libel actions brought by public figures as compared to 
private figures. 36 While a public figure can turn to the media to pro­
tect their reputation from false statements, private figures' access to 
the media is virtually non-existent. Therefore, as long as they do not 
impose strict liability, states may adopt a lower standard than actual 
malice for private plaintiffs.37 Finally, in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 
Inc.,38 the Supreme Court held that upon a motion for summary judg­
ment, a trial judge must evaluate whether the public figure plaintiff 
can show by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant acted 
with actual malice.39 Although the Supreme Court has not directly 
addressed the issue of actual malice in the context of quotations, sev­
eral related cases have indirectly addressed the issue. 
The Supreme Court, in St. Amant v. Thompson,40 elaborated on 
the actual malice standard of New York Times. 41 Reckless disregard 
for the truth is not measured by whether a reasonably prudent person 
would have published the statement, or investigated it before publish­
ing.42 Instead, there must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclu­
sion that the defendant actually doubted the truth ()f the publication. 
"Publishing with such doubts shows reckless disregard for truth or 
34. Id. 
35. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). In Gertz, the plaintiff was a well known lawyer who repre­
sented a family bringing a wrongful death action against a Chicago police officer. The 
magazine "American Opinion" attacked the credibility of the plaintiff. The magazine de­
scribed Gertz as a "Communist-fronter," and falsely implied that he had a criminal record. 
Id. at 325-26. 
36. Id. at 342-45. 
37. Id. at 347. 
38. 477 U.S. 242 (1986). 
39. Id. at 252. 
40. 390 U.S. 727 (1968). 
41. In a televised political speech, St. Amant, a candidate for public office, read both 
the questions he had asked a union member and the corresponding responses. One of the 
answers falsely charged Thompson, another union member, with criminal conduct. Id. at 
728-29. The case was tried before New York Times, and the trial court awarded Thompson 
$5,000 in damages. The Louisiana Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the record did 
not show that St. Amant had acted with actual malice. The Supreme Court of Louisiana 
reversed the appellate court, and held there was sufficient evidence that St. Amant acted 
with reckless disregard when deciding whether the statements about Thompson were. true. 
Id. The United States Supreme Court held that there was not enough evidence to prove 
actual malice. There was no evidence that indicated that St. Amant knew of the probable 
falsity of the statement about Thompson. Id. at 730. Furthermore, under the New York 
Times doctrine, a failure to investigate alone does not constitute bad faith. Id. at 733. 
42. Id. at 731. 
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falsity and demonstrates actual malice."43 However, the Court stated 
that liability cannot be avoided by a defendant by merely testifying 
that he or she published the article "with a belief that the statements 
were true."44 For a defendant to avoid liability, a fact-finder must 
determine that the publication was made in good faith. Furthermore, 
the Court warned that it would not be inclined to find a good faith 
belief in the truth of the statements when a story is fabricated or when 
there are reasons to doubt its accuracy.45 
Moreover, actual malice can be proven by either direct or circum­
stantial evidence. For instance, evidence that the defendant was aware 
of inconsistent information can support a finding of reckless disregard. 
In one case, a court held that there was sufficient evidence of reckless 
disregard when the defendant not only republished certain allegations 
in the face of strong contradictory information, but also added addi­
tional details to increase the credibility of the original statements. 46 
Courts may also infer reckless disregard when there were obvious rea­
sons for the reporter to doubt the source, or when the reporter had 
relied on an inherently ambiguous source.47 
In Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc.,48 the 
Court differentiated between the necessary proof for actual malice and 
mere proof of falsity.49 The Court held that "[t]he burden of proving 
43. Id. 
44. Id. at 732. 
45. Id. The Court stated that "[P]rofessions of good faith will be unlikely to prove 
persuasive ... where a story is fabricated ... [or] is the product of [a journalist's] imagina­
tion ...." Id. 
46. Goldwater v. Ginzburg, 414 F.ld 324, 337 (ld Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 
1049 (1970). 
47. See Bindrim v. Mitchell, 92 Cal. App. 3d 61, 155 Cal. Rptr. 29, cerro denied,444 
U.S. 984 (1979). In Bindrim, the plaintiff claimed that he was libelled in a fictional book. 
In affirming the award to the plaintiff, the California Court of Appeals held that "[s]ince 
actual malice concentrates solely on defendants' attitude toward the truth or falsity of the 
material published, and not on malicious motives," the defendant was in the best position 
to have this knowledge of her own material. Id. at 73, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 35. The court 
found actual malice from the author's knowledge of the real events and the fictional ac­
counts presented in her book. Since she attended the therapy sessions fictionalized in the 
novel, there could be no doubt that she knew the true facts. 
48. 466 U.S. 485 (1984). 
49. Id. at 511 n.30. In Bose, Consumer Reports published a seven page article which 
evaluated the quality of loudspeaker systems. In referring to the plaintiff's product, Con­
sumer Reports reported that the sound tended to wander about the room. The plaintiff 
claimed that this was a false statement of fact. The defendant moved for summary judg­
ment. Relying on the rationale set forth in Time. Inc. V. Pape, the Supreme Court held that 
the defendant's resolution was among a number of possible interpretations of an event that 
"bristled with ambiguities." Id. at 512-13 (quoting Time, Inc. V. Pape, 401 U.S. 279, 290 
(1971». The statement in Bose represented the type of inaccuracy that is common in the 
forum of robust debate to which the New York Times rule applies. Id. at 513. The choice 
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'actual malice' requires the plaintiff to demonstrate with clear and 
convincing evidence that the defendant realized that his statement was 
false or that he sUbjectively entertained serious doubts as to the truth 
of the statement."SO In Bose, the Court held that the defendant's de­
scription of the plaintiff's loudspeaker was a rational interpretation of 
an ambiguous events l 
The Supreme Court, in Harte-Hanks Communications v. Con­
naughton,S2 held that reckless disregard is a subjective standard and 
there must be sufficient evidence to conclude that the defendant acted 
with a "high degree of awareness of ... probable falsity."s3 "[A] pub­
lic figure plaintiff must prove more than an extreme departure from 
professional standards. "54 The Court maintained that judges have a 
duty to determine independently whether the evidence in the record is 
sufficient to support a judgment by clear and convincing proof of ac­
tual malice. 55 
In essence, the actual malice standard enunciated in New York 
Times and its progeny provides a reporter with wide latitude to pub­
lish without the threat of liability. 56 In Masson v. New Yorker Maga­
zine, Inc.,S7 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit maintained 
that the actual malice standard had not been satisfied when the plain­
tiff produced evidence of deliberate falsifications of statements made 
within quotations. 
of this language. the Court stated, although inaccurate, "does not place the speech beyond 
the outer limits of the First Amendment's broad protective umbrella." Id. 
50. [d. at 511 n.30. 
51. [d. at 512-13. 
52. 109 S. Ct. 2678 (1989). 
53. Id. at 2696 (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964». In Harte­
Hanks, the plaintiff was an unsuccessful candidate for the position of Municipal Judge of 
Hamilton, Ohio. Id. at 2681. The defendant, the publisher of a local newspaper, supported 
the re-election of the incumbent. Id. About one month before the election, the incum­
bent's Director of Court Services resigned and was arrested on a bribery charge. [d. at 
2681-82. A grand jury investigation ensued. [d. at 2682. The local newspaper, The Jour­
nal News, published a story quoting a jury witness as stating that the plaintiff, Con­
naughton, "had used 'dirty tricks' and offered her and her sister jobs and a trip to Florida 
'in appreciation' for their help in the investigation." Id. Connaughton sued the newspaper 
for libel, claiming that the story was published with actual malice. Id. 
54. Id. at 2684. 
55. Id. at 2695 (citing Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 
U.S. 485, 511 (1984». 
56. Statistics prove that the defendant in a libel action usually prevails. For actual 
statistics, see Franklin, Winners and Losers and Why: A Study ofDefamation Litigation, 
1980 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 455, 491. 
57. 895 F.2d 1535 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 39 (1990). 
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II. MASSON V. NEW YORKER MAGAZINE, INC 58 
In 1983, Janet Malcolm authored a two-part article in The New 
Yorker magazine about the termination of psychoanalyst Jeffrey M. 
Masson as Projects Director of the Sigmund Freud Archives.59 Mal­
colm's article, primarily based upon tape-recorded interviews with 
Masson, described his rise to prominence in the field of psychoanaly­
sis. Malcolm explained the struggle between Masson and other board 
members of the Freud Archives. According to Masson, he was fired 
because of his outspoken view that Dr. Freud had suppressed informa­
tion concerning sexual abuse of children.60 
In reviewing the prepublication draft of the article, Masson no­
ticed that the proposed publication contained several inaccuracies con­
cerning his quoted statements. 61 Masson notified the fact-checking 
department at The New Yorker magazine of the inaccuracies, claim­
ing that his quotations had been altered. He requested that the state­
ments attributed to him through quotations be verified.62 After his 
requests were ignored and the article published, Masson filed a libel 
suit against the author of the article, Janet Malcolm, and its publish­
ers, The New Yorker magazine and Alfred A. Knopf.63 
Masson contended that fabricated quotations and misleadingly 
edited statements attributed to him made him appear "unscholarly, 
irresponsible, vain, [and] lacking impersonal [sic] honesty and moral 
integrity."64 As proof of deliberate fabrication, Masson presented evi­
dence showing that several quotations attributed to him were not con­
tained in the tape-recorded sessions. 65 The district court granted the 
defendants' motion for summary judgment on the ground that Masson 
failed to present sufficient evidence that a reasonable jury would find 
58. Id. 
59. Id. at 1536. The article, entitled "Annals of Scholarship: Trouble in the 
Archives," was published in a two-part series in The New Yorker magazine. Malcolm's 
article was also published in book form by defendant Alfred A. Knopf. For purposes of 
this discussion, the term "article" will be used to discuss the libel action brought against 
both The New Yorker magazine and Alfred A. Knopf. 
60. Id. Masson claimed that Freud had abandoned the "seduction theory," which 
hypothesizes that certain medical illnesses originate in sexual abuse during childhood. Id. 
Masson claimed that he was fired from his position at the Freud Archives because he pub­
licly announced his views that Freud had suppressed the seduction. theory to further his 
career and appease his colleagues. Id. 
61. Id. at 1537. 
62. Id. at 1568. 
63. Id. at 1536. 
64. Id. 
65. Id. at 1537. 
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actual malice by clear and convincing evidence. 66 
Masson subsequently appealed to the Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit. He argued that actual malice could be proven from 
evidence that Malcolm fabricated quotations attributed to him, and 
that prior to pUblication he had alerted the staff at The New Yorker 
magazine.67 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the 
decision of the district court. For purposes of summary judgment, the 
court assumed that all the quotations were deliberately altered, and 
held as a matter of law that actual malice could not be established 
based on the fabrication. 68 
In reaching its decision, the majority noted that neither the 
Supreme Court of the United States nor the Supreme Court of Califor­
nia had addressed the specific issue of whether actual malice can be 
established through evidence of fabricated quotations.69 Relying on 
other state and federal court decisions, the Ninth Circuit established 
the current law governing fictionalized quotations. First, and perhaps 
most important, the court held that actual malice will not be inferred 
if the fabricated quotations are " 'rational interpretations' of ambigu­
ous remarks."70 Second, the court stated that fictionalization or dram­
atization of conversations are not actionable if the changes "do not 
'alter the substantive content' of unambiguous remarks actually 
made" by the speaker.71 Third, the court held that actual malice can 
be proved by fabricated quotations only when they are "wholly the 
product of the author's imagination."72 The court reviewed the 
passages to determine whether actual malice could be inferred. The 
court found that the challenged quotations were either rational inter­
pretations of ambiguous statements, or did not alter the substantive 
content of what Masson actually said. The majority, therefore, denied 
66. 686 F. Supp. 1396 (N.D. Cal. 1987), aff'd, 895 F.2d 1535 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. 
granted, 111 S. Ct. 39 (1990). 
67. Masson, 895 F.2d at 1537. 
68. Id. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. at 1539 (citing Dunn v. Gannett New York Newspapers, 833 F.2d 446 (3d. 
Cir. 1987». . 
71. Id. (quoting Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche, 551 F.2d 910,914 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 
sub nom Hotchner v. Doubleday & Co., 434 U.S. 834 (1977». 
72. Id. (citing Carson v. Allied News Co., 529 F.2d 206, 213 (7th Cir. 1976». Addi­
tionally, Masson claimed that Malcolm took statements out of context, and made it appear 
that Masson said the exact opposite of what he actually did. For example, Malcolm deleted 
33 out of 40 words in a sentence, changing Masson's meaning to make him say the opposite 
of what he actually said. The majority of the court also held that these statements were 
non-actionable. Masson, 895 F.2d at 1545-46, 1553. 
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Masson relief. 73 
Judge Kozinski, in dissent, stated, "[t]he majority and I part com­
pany on a simple but fundamental point: the meaning of quota­
tions."74 Although he agreed that first amendment freedoms should 
be highly protected, Judge Kozinski argued that journalists should not 
be given the right to alter quotations deliberately. According to the 
dissent, quotations are understood as containing no interpretations by 
the writer and by using quotation marks the writer guarantees that he 
or she "has interposed no editorial comment, has resolved no ambigui­
ties, [and] has added or detracted nothing of substance."7S Further, 
Judge Kozinski stated that the rational interpretation doctrine is par­
ticularly troublesome in the context of quotations because statements 
could vary in content and wording from what was actually said "so 
long as the writer can argue with a straight face that it is a rational 
interpretation of what the speaker said. "76 
Finding the law cited by the majority inapplicable, the dissent 
analyzed the policy reasons behind New York Times v. Sullivan and 
subsequent cases.77 The dissent maintained that the rational interpre­
tation standard is appropriate only in circumstances when a reporter is 
attempting to describe or summarize statements or descriptions.78 
Judge Kozinski, dissatisfied with the majority's application of the ra­
tional interpretation standard in the context of quotations, advocated 
a five-step inquiry in order to determine whether liability should ensue 
from a misquotation.79 
73. Id. at 1548. 
74. Id. (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 
75. Id. at 1549. According to the dissent, readers give more weight and credibility to 
a quotation than to a paraphrase or description. Id. 
76. Id. at 1548 (emphasis in original). 
77. Id. at 1557. 
78. Id. 
79. Id. at 1562. The five-step inquiry is: 
1. Does the quoted material purport to be a verbatim repetition of what the speaker 
said? 
2. Is it inaccurate? 
3. Is the inaccuracy material? 
4. Is the inaccuracy defamatory? 
5. Is the inaccuracy the result of malice? 
The defendant would be entitled to a favorable judgment if anyone of these questions 
were answered in the negative. Applying this standard to the defendants, Judge Kozinski 
would have reversed the summary judgment granted by the district court. Id. 
139 1991] MASSON v. NEW YORKER MAGAZINE. INC 
III. ANALYSIS 
The public looks to the press not only as a forum for divergent 
ideas and opinions but, equally important, as a source of accurate 
accounts of newsworthy events. Permitting the press intentionally 
to disseminate false and defamatory reports with impunity would be 
to damage its credibility and ultimately to injure the press as an 
institution.80 
The Masson decision did just that. 
The majority in Masson led the reader to believe that it merely 
followed existing case law. In reality, however, by taking bits and 
pieces of prior opinions unrelated to the issues of this case, the major­
ity was just as guilty as was Janet Malcolm of taking phrases out of 
context. The majority's analysis was flawed for the following reasons. 
First, the court interpreted existing case law incorrectly, and therefore, 
misapplied the rational interpretation standard enunciated by the 
Supreme Court in Time, Inc. Y. Pape. 81 Second, journalistic standards 
do not support the Masson decision. This Note advocates the ap­
proach taken by the Masson dissent. 
A. Misinterpretation of the Rational Interpretation Standard 
Commentators have stated that the actual malice standard must 
be employed with caution when quotations are used.82 Quotations are 
used frequently and provide the core of many news articles and edito­
rials. Perhaps one of the most common reactions from a person who 
has been portrayed less than favorably in print is to allege that they 
have been misquoted.83 However, in the world of journalism, editing 
the material is "the rule rather than the exception,"84 especially when 
the journalist is dealing with a large number of quoted passages. 
Courts should not get involved in determinations of style or editorial 
judgments. 
In order to protect journalists from liability under certain circum­
stances, the Supreme Court established the rational interpretation 
standard. In reaching its decision, however, the Masson court relied 
on two cases, Time, Inc. Y. Pape 8S and Dunn v. Gannett New York 
80. Schermerhorn v. Rosenberg, 73 A.D.2d 276, 288,426 N.Y.S.2d 274, 284 (1980). 
81. 401 U.S. 279 (1971). 
82. See. e.g., R. SACK, LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS 67 (1986). 
83. Id.; see also R. SMOLLA, supra note 8, at § 3.32. 
84. R. SACK, supra note 82, at 67. 
85. 401 U.S. 279 (1971). 
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Newspapers,86 neither of which extended the rational interpretation 
doctrine to deliberately fabricated quotations. By applying this doc­
trine in Masson, the majority distorted the purpose of the rational in­
terpretation standard. 
Addressing specific issues pertaining to errors of interpretation, 
the Supreme Court in Time, Inc. v. Pape 87 established guidelines for 
determining whether actual malice may be inferred from evidence 
showing misleading editing. InPape, the United States Commission 
on Civil Rights issued a study on police brutality. One week later, 
Time magazine published an article about the Commission's study. 
The Time article described cases of police brutality and contained sev­
eral direct quotations from the Commission's report. 8S Specifically, 
the article described an alleged racially motivated beating by Officer 
Pape, a Chicago police officer.89 Time magazine failed to indicate that 
the charges of police brutality were only allegations in a complaint, 
and not independent findings by the Civil Rights Commission.9O The 
Time article made it appear that the Commission report stated that 
the beatings had' actually occurred.91 Both the author of the article 
and his research 'assistant admitted that they were aware at the time 
the article was published "that the wording of the Commission Report 
had been significantly altered, but insisted that its real meaning had 
not been changed. "92 Pape sued, claiming that actual malice could be 
inferred from the omission of the word "alleged" in the article. 93 
The Supreme Court held that the wording of the Commission re­
port was ambiguous, and that the magazine's resolution of ambiguities 
did not establish actual malice.94 The Court recognized that a press 
report can contain "an almost infinite variety of shadings,"9S and that 
the omission of the word "alleged" was valid since it was "one of a 
number of possible rational interpretations of a document that bristled 
with ambiguities."96 The Supreme Court, therefore, held that there 
was not enough evidence to create a jury issue of actual malice under 
86. 833 F.2d 446 (3d. Cir. 1987). 
87. 401 U.S. 279 (1971). 
88. [d. at 282. 
89. [d. at 281. 
90. [d. at 282. In fact, during the trial Pape called the police officers who had partic. 
ipated in the raid to testify. All of the police officers testified that nothing resembling the 
events described in the Time magazine article had actually occurred. [d. at 282·83. 
91. [d. at 284-85. 
92. [d. at 285. 
93. See id. at 282·83. 
94. [d. at 292. 
95. [d. at 286. 
96. [d. at 290. 
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the New York Times standard of reckless disregard for the truth.97 
Mistakes of this kind, the Court concluded, must be protected under 
the first amendment. 98 The Court reasoned that a directed verdict was 
appropriate in this circumstance because freedom of speech would be 
chilled if a jury determined whether actual malice existed, particularly 
where the alleged libel consists of a misinterpretation of a lengthy gov­
ernment document.99 Additionally, journalists would be deterred 
from voicing their criticism of official conduct because of the fear and 
cost of litigation. 
The rational interpretation doctrine established in Pape is based 
on a reporter's need to rely on a source which is descriptive. 1oo When 
a description is unclear, "a reporter runs the risk of inaccuracy if he 
[or she] misunderstands or deliberately chooses one of several possible 
interpretations."101 In such cases, the rational interpretation standard 
is a necessary safeguard. Consequently, due to the time constraints 
placed upon most journalists, granting a reporter the latitude to 
choose from a variety of interpretations appears to be justified. Courts 
are not willing, nor should they be willing, to intrude on the choice of 
language employed by reporters in such circumstances. 
The question that remains, however, is whether reporters should 
be given the liberty to choose from a variety of interpretations when 
dealing with direct quotations. Pape did not address this issue. Pape 
allowed a journalist to select and publish portions of quoted excerpts 
from a Civil Rights Commission Report; it did not sanction the use of 
invented or altered quotations. 102 Under Pape, a reporter may select 
particular passages to quote from, shaping the article by omissions and 
inclusions, but he or she is not allowed to alter quoted passages. Fur­
thermore, the Supreme Court warned lower courts that the decision in 
Pape was limited to the specific facts of the case, and that "[n]either 
lies nor false communication serves the ends of the First Amendment, 
97. ]d. 
98. Id. at 292. A few years later the Supreme Court extended its approval of the 
rational interpretation doctrine in Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc .• 
466 U.S. 485 (1984). For a discussion of Bose, see supra notes 48-51 and accompanying 
text. For a further discussion of Bose, see Note. The Future ofLibel Law and Independent 
Appellate Review: Making Sense ofBose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc .• 
71 CoRNELL L. REv. 477 (1986). 
99. Pape. 401 U.S. at 291. 
100. Bloom, ProofofFault in Media Defamation Litigation, 38 VAND. L. REV. 247, 
290 (1985). 
101. Id. 
102. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 895 F.2d 1535, 1557 (9th Cir. 1989) 
(Kozinski, J., dissenting), cert. granted, III S. Ct. 39 (1990). 
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and no one suggests their desirability or further proliferation."t03 By 
extending the rational interpretation standard to quotations, the Mas­
son court has indirectly furthered the proliferation of lies. 
In fact, insofar as the facts in Masson and Pape are similar, the 
analysis in Pape supports the proposition that journalists should not be 
protected by the first amendment for deliberate alterations of quota­
tions. In Pape, the court of appeals concluded that the omission of the 
word "allegation" was a falsification of the report. t04 The malice re­
quirement might be reasonably inferred, the court stated, from the de­
liberate and conscious omission of the word "alleged."tOS Therefore, 
the issue of malice was for the jury. 106 Referring to the decision of the 
court of appeals, the Supreme Court in Pape stated that "[a]nalysis of 
this kind may be adequate when the alleged libel purports to be an 
eyewitness or other direct account of events that speak for 
themselves."107 
In contrast to the Commission report in Pape, although Masson's 
meaning might have been ambiguous, his tape-recorded statements 
were not. The article in Masson purported to be a direct account of 
events that speak for themselves-Masson's own words. Thus, Pape 
seems to indicate that Masson should be entitled to a jury determina­
tion on the issue of actual malice. 
The Masson court also relied heavily on the Third Circuit's ap­
proach to libel in the context of quotations in Dunn v. Gannett New 
York Newspapers. lOs Dunn involved a libel action brought by the 
mayor of Elizabeth, New Jersey as a result of statements published in 
a Spanish language daily newspaper.l09 During a campaign debate, 
the mayor commented on the city's litter problem. I to A Spanish news­
paper headline, translated into English, read "Elizabeth Mayor on the 
103. Pape, 401 u.s. at 292 (quoting St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 732 
(1968». 




108. 833 F.2d 446 (3d Cir. 1987). 
109. Id. at 446. 
110. Id. at 448. The mayor stated: 
But litter, of course, is an ever growing problem because we are a very busy, a 
growing city .... You have a lot of new people moving into the City of Elizabeth, 
some coming from foreign lands where abject poverty was something they lived 
with everyday ... and it will take a great deal of time for some of them to respect 
the rights and properties of other people, and above all, to respect a city that 
offers them a home in what I consider to be a wholesome environment. 
Id. 
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attack: CALLS HISPANICS 'PIGS.' "111 The mayor argued that by 
enclosing the Spanish word, "cerdos" in single quotation marks, the 
newspaper made it appear that the mayor had used the word "pigs" 
when discussing the litter problem. The mayor contended that actual 
malice could be inferred since the "pigs" quote was fabricated, and the 
defendant newspaper knew that the headline was an exaggeration. 
Claiming that the quotation marks were used to indicate that the word 
was used in a figurative sense, the defendant introduced evidence that 
the "use of quotation marks in Spanish does not necessarily signify 
that a literal quotation is intended."1l2 Consequently, the court of ap­
peals affirmed the summary judgment for the defendants granted by 
the district court. 113 
The Masson court inaccurately interpreted Dunn to support the 
conclusion that a deliberately altered statement made within quotation 
marks is not evidence of actual malice. Dunn does not stand for this 
proposition. Rather, the Third Circuit in Dunn addressed the narrow 
issue of actual malice as applied to a translation from Spanish to Eng­
lish. Additionally, because quotation marks in Spanish are not 
equivalent to those in English, the Masson analysis is not supported by 
Dunn. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reasoned that, at 
most, Dunn's evidence showed that the defendant mischaracterized 
the mayor's remarks. The court was unwilling to find actual malice 
based solely on the Spanish-to-English translation of the language 
used by the newspaper, and was convinced that the word "cerdos" was 
a "fair, albeit inadequate, translation" of the mayor's remarks. 1l4 The 
defendant was granted summary judgment in Dunn because Dunn 
failed to present any countervailing evidence of actual malice. Again, 
the Masson facts are different. The plaintiff presented evidence of 
tape-recorded interviews that clearly proved that Janet Malcolm delib­
erately altered statements placed within quotations. Thus, Dunn is in­
apposite, and does not support the majority's approach in Masson. 
The rational interpretation standard is appropriate when a re­
porter is summarizing a report, as in Pape, or translating a speech, as 
in Dunn. The rational interpretation standard is appropriate under 
these circumstances because the original statements themselves were 
ambiguous. The journalist in Dunn chose an interpretation, and the 
reader was not left with the Unpression that these exact words were 
111. Id. 
112. Id. at 451. 
113. Id. at 455. 
114. Id. at 452 (emphasis added). 
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spoken. The result is different when direct quotations are utilized. 
When the journalist is directly quoting from tape-recorded interviews, 
it is inappropriate to apply the rational interpretation standard to quo­
tations because the issues of ambiguity, summarization, or translation 
do not apply. 
Applying the rational interpretation standard to quotations con­
flicts with the purposes of the actual malice standard. For example, a 
contested passage in Malcolm's article referred to Masson's relation­
ship with two other members of the Freud Archives, Anna Freud and 
Dr. Eissler. In the article, Malcolm quoted Masson as stating that 
"[Anna Freud and Dr. Eissler] loved to hear from me what creeps and 
dolts analysts are. I was like an intellectual gigolo-you get your plea­
sure from him, but you don't take him out in public."lIS This passage 
was not found in the tape recordings. Rather, the transcripts show 
that Masson's actual words were: 
[I]n a sense, I ... was a private asset but a public liability. They 
like [sic] me when I was alone in their living room, and I could talk 
and chat and tell them the truth about things .... But that I was, in 
a sense, much too junior within the hierarchy of analysis, for these 
important training analysts to be caught dead with me. 116 
Applying the rational interpretation standard to this passage, the ma­
jority held that actual malice could not be inferred because the use of 
the descriptive term "intellectual gigolo" was a rational interpretation 
of Masson's comments. 117 
Masson's actual statements are different from the quo~ation Mal­
colm reported in both tone and content. Masson's statements were 
sufficiently clear that they did not need any further interpretation. 
There is a difference between the principle that a defendant may select 
from various interpretations of the "truth" and a principle that allows 
conscious manipulation of the "truth" by a journalist. One commen­
tator noted that at some point the journalist distorts the meaning to 
such an extent as to create a jury issue of actual malice. lIS 
The meaning of a statement placed within quotations stands for 
itself and requires no additional interpretation. According to the dis­
115. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 895 F.2d 1535, 1540 (9th Cir. 1989), 
cert. granted, III S. Ct. 39 (1990). 
116. Id. 
117. Id. at 1541. Judge Kozinski explains, "[b]eing too junior to be taken seriously is 
quite different from being a public embarrassment; one suggests that Masson is a young 
man with potential, the other makes him out to be a clown." Id. at 1552 (Kozinski, J., 
dissenting). 
118. R. SMOLLA, supra note 8, § 3.20[3], at 3-54. 
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sent in Masson, readers give more weight to direct quotations than to 
descriptive passages. Judge Kozinski explained this phenomenon, 
stating that experienced writers use direct quotations "as if to say: 
'[slee here, don't just take my word for it, he said it himself.' "119 In 
the present case, Malcolm invented words and then ascribed them to 
Masson. Masson's tape-recorded statements did not need any rational 
interpretation because Malcolm had available to her a completely ac­
curate source of what was actually said. It was for the reader, not 
Janet Malcolm, to draw his or her own conclusions and interpret Mas­
son's actual remarks. 120 If Malcolm felt compelled to publish her in­
terpretation of her conversations with Masson, she could have 
published that interpretation without deceiving the reader into believ­
ing that the statements were Masson's actual words. Malcolm had the 
option of paraphrasing the conversations, thus signalling to the reader 
that Malcolm's article was her own "rational interpretation" of her 
conversations with Masson. . 
There is a need to grant a reporter some degree of literary license. 
A journalist is often faced with pressures such as time constraints 
when a story has an immediate deadline. A reporter's interviews are 
frequently unscheduled, and invariably reporters do not have enough 
time or resources to investigate and check the accuracy of the story. 
Because of the nature of the newsgathering process, a reporter is pro­
tected from inadvertent or negligent mistakes under New York Times, 
and is given the necessary latitude under Pape to interpret an ambigu­
ous statement. None of these difficulties are present when the reporter 
has a verbatim tape of the statements to be used in the article. In this 
situation, fabricating statements placed in quotation marks is 
unwarranted. 
B. 	 Masson's Misinterpretation of Existing Case Law Concerning 
Fabricated Quotations-Carson v. Allied News Co. 121 
In addition to misinterpreting the rational interpretation stan­
dard, the Masson majority also misapplied other existing case law. 
The majority ignored the reasoning which governed the Seventh Cir­
cuit's decision in Carson v. Allied News Co., 122 a case factually more 
similar to Masson than either Pape or Dunn. Carson involved an ac­
119. 	 Masson, 895 F.2d at 1549 (Kozinski, J. dissenting). 
120. According to the dissent, minor changes in a quotation can have major effects, 
and the skilled writer can alter the reader's perception far more effectively than if she had 
disclosed her editorial role. Id. 
121. 	 529 F.2d 206 (7th Cir. 1976). 
122. 	 Id. 
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tion by Johnny Carson of "The Tonight Show" television program 
against the defendant's tabloid. The defendant published an article 
stating that "The Tonight Show" was moving from the East Coast to 
the West Coast, in order for Carson to "be closer to the woman' who 
broke up his marriage."123 Part of the article concerned an alleged 
struggle between Carson and National Broadcasting Co. executives, 
and contained statements by Carson to the executives and the execu­
tives' responses and reactions. 124 The defendant never interviewed or 
spoke with Carson. Rather, the defendant-writer claimed that while 
he had fabricated the conversations, these fabrications were justified 
because the quoted conversations were logical extensions of the facts 
of a previous story.12' 
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the grant 
of summary judgment and maintained that by imagining the "facts," 
the defendant "entertained serious doubts as to the truth of the state­
ments."126 The court stated: 
In the catalogue of responsibilities of journalists, right next to 
plagiarism, . . . must be a canon that a journalist does not invent 
quotations and attribute them to actual persons. If a writer can sit 
down in the quiet of his cubicle and create conversations as "a logi­
cal extension of what must have gone on" and dispense this as news, 
it is difficult to perceive what First Amendment protection such fic­
tion can claim. 127 
The Masson court improperly limited the Carson holding to stand for 
the proposition that a fact finder may infer malice from a fabricated 
quotation only when the language is wholly the product of the author's 
imagination. The Ninth Circuit decision would have enabled Mal­
colm to "sit down in the quiet of [her] cubicle, and create conversa­
tions as 'a logical extension of what must have gone on.' "128 Under 
the unwarranted extension of the rational interpretation standard, 
Malcolm was able to accomplish what was prohibited by the Seventh 
Circuit in Carson. 
The underlying rationale for not protecting deliberately altered 
quotations is that they are not worthy of first amendment protection. 
If the invented quotations at issue in Carson were not worthy of first 
amendment protection, then the invented quotations in Masson cer­
123. [d. at 212. The source of the quote was Joanna Holland, Carson's second wife. 
124. [d. 
125. [d. 
126. [d. at 213. 
127. [d. (quoting St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 732 (1968». 
128. See id. (quoting St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 732 (1968». 
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tainly should not be. The Supreme Court recognized the difference 
between honest error and fabrication and stated in Garrison v. 
Louisiana:129 
The use of calculated falsehood . . . would put a different cast 
on the constitutional question. Although honest utterance, even if 
inaccurate, may further the fruitful exercise of the right of free 
speech, it does not follow that the lie, knowingly and deliberately 
published about a public official, should enjoy a like immunity.l30 
The Masson majority departed from the Supreme Court's rationale in 
Garrison. The purpose of the actual malice standard enunciated in 
New York Times is to encourage speech on issues of public concern, 
not to protect the media from deliberate and conscious manipulation 
of speech, whether that speech is placed within quotations or not. The 
actual malice standard was established to protect the media from self­
censorship and from errors that are inevitable in free debate. 131 False 
statements are only protected if honestly made. 132 A contrary rule in 
Masson would not result in self-censorship; rather, it would promote 
accurate, precise, and honest journalism. The type of intentional ma­
nipulation that Malcolm engaged in is closer to the "calculated false­
hood" of Garrison 133 than to the type of inevitable error examined in 
New York Times.l 34 Because Malcolm's fabrications were deliberate, 
she should not have been given protection under the standard stated in 
New York Times. 
Furthermore, the Masson court's distinction between fabricated 
quotations which are wholly the product of the writer's imagination, 
and those which depart significantly from the speaker's remarks is 
nonsensical given the purpose of the actual malice standard. Under 
the Masson court's analysis, a deceptive journalist can avoid liability 
by fabricating ninety-nine percent of a conversation placed in quota­
tions, and adding one sentence from what the speaker actually said. 
Because the conversation is not wholly the product of the author's 
imagination, the fact finder would never be allowed to determine 
whether the journalist acted with actual malice. If a jury issue of ac­
tual malice existed in Carson, then there should be one in Masson as 
well. Additionally, Masson contends that insofar as Malcolm did 
129. 379 U.S. 64 (1964). 
130. Id. at 75. 
131. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271, 280 (1964). 
132. Id. at 278. 
133. 379 U.S. 64. 
134. 376 U.S. 254. 
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fabricate the language attributed to him, it was wholly the product of 
Malcolm's imagination. Because Masson presented significant evi­
dence of alteration of his statements and fabrication of quotations, 
summary judgment was inappropriate even under the majority's view 
of Carson. 
C. Journalistic Ethics 
The Supreme Court has steadily expanded an author's protection 
regarding articles about public officials, public figures, and matters of 
public concern. 13S In fact, statistics prove that in the vast majority of 
cases, the defendant is ultimately successful in a libel action. 136 Ethi­
cal journalists do not need the additional protection of the rational 
interpretation standard in the context of quotations. The Masson 
court improperly decided that the press should not have to ~ the 
burden of making sure that what they put in quotation marks is accu­
rate. This is not a heavy burden to place on journalists, who are in the 
best position to verify the accuracy of the quoted passages. In Mas­
son's case, all Malcolm (or The New Yorker, for that matter) had to 
do was replay the tape of Malcolm's conversations with Masson to 
verify the stat6ments attributed to him. No doubt this job is cumber­
some, but it is not excessively burdensome if it will protect a reporter 
from liability. Failing to verify the statements attributed to Masson 
following notification that the statements may have been fabricated 
should have been evidence of actual malice. 
Journalists are confronted with ethical decisions in almost every 
aspect of the editing process. 137 In order to have some criteria of pro­
fessionalism in the field of journalism, reporters rely heavily on a code 
of ethics. The foundation of one typical code of ethics is accuracy, 
objectivity, and good faith.138 Such a code of ethics establishes some 
135. G. GUNTHER, CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW 1058-62 (11th ed. 1985). 
136. Most jury verdicts for plaintiffs in a defamation action are overturned on ap­
peal. Federal courts have reversed approximately seventy percent of the libel judgments 
won by plaintiffs which involved actual malice. Note, First Amendment: Tavoulareas v. 
Piro: An Extensive Exercise 0/ Independent Judgment, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 854, 854 
n.l (1988); see also Bezanson, The Libel Suit in Retrospect: What Plaintiffs Want and What 
Plaintiffs Get, 74 CAL. L. REV. 789 (1986) (overall success rate for plaintiffs through a 
judgment was ten percent); Franklin, Winners and Losers and Why: A Study 0/De/amation 
Litigation, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 455; Franklin, Good Names and Bad Law: A 
Critique 0/ Libel Law and a Proposal, 18 U.S.F. L. REv. 1, 3-5 (1983) (At the summary 
judgment stage, media defendants are successful in almost 75% of their efforts to have their 
cases dismissed before trial. Plaintiffs who sue the media are awarded judgments in ap­
proximately five to ten percent of all libel cases.). 
137. See M. CULLEN, MASS MEDIA & THE FiRST AMENDMENT 335 (1981). 
138. Id. at 336. 
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guidelines for the journalist. These guidelines include: 
1. 	 Truth is our ultimate goal. 
2. 	 Objectivity in reporting the news is another goal which serves 
as the mark of an experienced professional. 
3. 	 There is no excuse for inaccuracies or lack of thoroughness. 
6. 	 Partisanship in editorial comment which knowingly departs 
from the truth violates the spirit of American journalism. 139 
Malcolm violated the spirit of journalistic ethics by fabricating quota­
tions, and the Ninth Circuit condoned this breach by providing Mal­
colm with the benefit of the rational interpretation standard. 
According to The Associated Press Stylebook and Libel Manual, 
another source heavily relied upon by journalists, quotation marks are 
used "[t]o surround the exact words of a speaker or writer when re­
ported in a story."I40 In determining when to use full quotes as com­
pared to partial quotes, the Stylebook states, "[i]f a speaker's words 
are clear and concise, favor the full quote. If cumbersome language 
can be paraphrased fairly, use an indirect construction, reserving quo­
tation marks for sensitive or controversial passages that must be iden­
tified specifically as coming from the speaker."141 Thus, even 
journalistic standards do not adhere to the Masson standard that al­
lows a journalist to consciously manipulate quotations. 
A court is not required to base its decisions on journalistic stan­
dards. However, the standards that journalists impose upon them­
selves can be valuable to a court in evaluating any given journalist'S 
actions. As Judge Kozinski explained: "[t]ruth is a journalist'S stock 
in trade. To invoke the right to deliberately distort what someone else 
has said is to assert the right to lie in print. . . . Masson has lost his 
case, but the defendants, and the profession to which they belong, 
have lost far more."142 The court is in effect allowing Malcolm to 
change not only the meaning of the statements made by Masson, but 
also the concept behind quotations. No warning was given to the 
reader that these were not Masson's exact words. The reasonable 
reader of Malcolm's article would likely have drawn the conclusion 
that Masson used the exact words ascribed to him since that is the 
139. Id. 
140. THE AssociATED PRESS STYLEBOOK AND LIBEL MANUAL 183 (1980) (empha­
sis added). 
141. Id. at 184. 
142. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine. Inc .• 895 F.2d 1535. 1570 (9th Cir. 1989) 
(Kozinski. J. dissenting). cert. granted. III S. Ct. 39 (1990). 
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meaning of a quotation in a non-fiction piece.143 In other words, the 
reader of Malcolm's article was not informed that, in effect, he or she 
was reading fiction. 
D. The Dissent's Approach-The Central Meaning Standard 
Perhaps one of the most troubling aspects of the Masson ap­
proach is that it fails to provide journalists, lawyers, and judges with a 
clear standard to determine liability. Masson does not provide any 
predictability or stability in the context of deliberately altered quota­
tions because the writer could differ dramatically in what he or she 
considers a rational interpretation. 
However, there are several reasons why a court should not adopt 
a rule that deliberate fabrications of quotations are, as a matter of law, 
evidence of actual malice. There are situations in which a journalist 
may change grammar and diction, yet remain true to the meaning of 
the quote. l44 In reality, it is not always possible to be literally accu­
rate. 14S Many journalists adhere to the practice that a quote can be 
considered acceptable if it honestly reflects what the speaker said. l46 
Additionally, verbatim transcripts can prove to be embarrassing to the 
speaker because many people make poor word choices, and use ram­
bling and incomplete sentences. 147 In this situation, minor alteration 
of a quotation is acceptable. Conversely, there are circumstances in 
which the alteration of a quotation is viewed as questionable. 
The dissent's five-part analysis strikes a balance between the ma­
jority's approach in Masson, and a per se rule of liability. Judge 
Kozinski's approach can be viewed as the traditional approach to the 
determination of liability in a libel claim. The dissent began its analy­
sis with the proposition that "what somebody says is a fact, and that 
doctoring a quotation is no more protected by the first amendment 
than is any other falsification."148 Judge Kozinski's five-step inquiry 
then asked: 
143. See Zimmerman, Real People in Fiction: Cautionary Words About Troublesome 
Old Torts Poured Into New Jugs, 51 BROOKLYN L. REv. 355, 361 (1985). 
144. Masson, 895 F.2d at 1558-59 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (citing M. CHARNLEY & 
B. CHARNLEY, REPORTING 248 (4th ed. 1979); J. HULTENG, THE MESSENGER'S Mo­
TIVES: ETHICAL PROBLEMS OF THE NEWS MEDIA 70 (1976) ("(m]ost of the newspaper 
codes or canons tend to stress literal accuracy when quoting news sources"». 
145. Masson, 895 F.2d at 1558. 
146. Id. (citing J. HULTENG, THE MESSENGER'S MOTIVES: ETHICAL PROBLEMS OF 
THE NEWS MEDIA 70-71 (1976». 
147. Id. at 1559 (citing J. OLEN, ETHICS IN JOURNALISM 100 (1988». 
148. Id. at 1562. 
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(1) 	Does the quoted material purport to be a verbatim repetition of 
what the speaker said? 
(2) 	If so, is it inaccurate? 
(3) 	If so, is the inaccuracy material? 
(4) 	If so, is the inaccuracy defamatory? 
(5) 	If so, is the inaccuracy the result of malice, i. e., is it a fabri­
cation or was it committed in reckless disregard of the truth?149 
Accordingly, if any of these questions are answered in the negative, 
the inquiry terminates and the defendant prevails as a matter oflaw.lso 
If all of these questions could be answered affirmatively, then the issue 
would be one for the jury to determine. Under such a standard, Mas­
son's case would be sent to the jury. lSI 
The approach taken by the dissent in Masson is preferable to the 
one chosen by the majority. The first question resolves the problem of 
when an author is using quotes not to represent a speaker's actual 
words, but for a literary purpose. 1S2 An example of this is a hypotheti­
cal conversation, where quotations are used explicitly to convey the 
journalist's thoughts, not the speaker's verbatim words. Some journal­
ists forewarn the reader in the beginning of the article that the quota­
tion marks do not represent the speaker's actual words.1S3 Under 
these circumstances, it is reasonable not to hold the journalist liable 
because the reader is expected to understand that the passage is not 
verbatim, but rather that the author is using a rhetorical device. 1S4 




152. The dissent discusses the school ofthought known as "New Journalism" which 
advocates the view that a joumalist is entitled to vary or rearrange the facts of a story in 
order to advance a literary purpose. However, this type ofjournalism is very controversial, 
and has been attacked by many journalists. Writer John Hersey stated: 
[T]here is one sacred rule ofjournalism. The writer must not invent. The legend 
on the license must read: NONE OF THIS WAS MADE UP. The ethics of 
journalism ... must be based on the simple truth that every journalist knows the 
difference between the distortion that comes from subtracting observed data and 
the distortion that comes from adding invented data. 
Id. at 1559·60 n.14. (citing Hersey, The Legend on the License, THE YALE REv., Autumn 
1980, at I, 2). 
153. Id. at 1563. In Baker v. Los Angeles Herald Examiner, the issue was whether it 
was reasonable for a reader to understand that the quoted passage was not verbatim. 42 
Cal. 3d 254, 721 P.2d 87, 228 Cal. Rptr. 206 (1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1032 (1987). 
The court held that although the defendant used quotation marks, he was not purporting to 
quote the plaintiff. "Instead, ... [the defendant] explicitly qualified the disputed statement 
by warning the reader that he was not reporting a fact but only giving his 'impression.' " 
Id. Itt 263, 721 P.2d at 92, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 211. 
154. Masson, 895 F.2d at 1563 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 
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this stage, the court should compare what the speaker said with what 
he or she is reported as having said. ISS If the situation involves a 
translation, or a partially inaudible statement, then the journalist may 
have to make an editorial judgment as to what was actually said. ls6 
Absent reckless or deliberate fabrication, deference must be given to 
the writer's choice of words. ls7 Accordingly, in Masson's case, the 
quotes can be considered inaccurate because Malcolm did not claim 
that the statements were inaudible, and they certainly were not being 
translated from another language. ISS 
The third question to be answered is whether the inaccuracies are 
material. Cosmetic changes that attempt to keep the speaker from 
looking foolish are not material as they do not substantively change 
what the speaker said. ls9 However, if the inaccuracies are more than a 
cosmetic change, the alteration should be found to be material. l60 
The fourth question is whether the alterations were defama­
tory. 161 This is a basic requirement in a libel case. The evidence ofthe 
misquotations that "paint Masson as a vain, shallow, disingenuous, 
intellectually dishonest, cold, heartless, self-absorbed individual"162 is 
sufficient for the jury to find the quotes defamatory. 
Finally, the fifth inquiry is whether the alterations were the result 
of malice. 163 Thus, in the present case, the question that must be an­
swered is whether the defendants knew that Masson's statements were 
different from those attributed to him, or whether the defendants acted 
with reckless disregard of the truth. l64 In Malcolm's case, there was 
strong circumstantial evidence of actual malice. Malcolm was not on 
a deadline to get the story published. '6s Therefore, she could have 
easily verified the statements placed within quotations. Furthermore, 
many passages that she attributed to Masson were nearly identical to 
the taped passages, except that key words were added, deleted, or 
changed. '66 Additionally, there was at least one instance that con­
tained direct evidence that Malcolm had engaged in deliberate 





160. Id. at 1565. 
161. Id. 
162. Id. 
163. Id. at 1566. 
164. Id. 
165. Id. at 1567. 
166. Id. at 1566. 
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fabrication. 167 
Under the dissent's approach, The New Yorker magazine could 
also be found to have acted with actual malice. A jury could infer 
recklessness when Masson notified The New Yorker of the inaccura­
cies in the quoted passages, and The New Yorker failed to respond. 168 
Further, a jury could consider The New Yorker's reputation for 
"scrupulous accuracy" in order to determine whether it had acted 
recklessly.169 Because of this status, readers of The New Yorker rea­
sonably expect accuracy in reporting, and "are more likely to accept at 
face value the quotes they read in New Yorker articles."170 Under this 
analysis, the Masson case would have been heard by the jury.l7l 
The dissent's approach and reasoning is more closely related to 
the principles of New York Times and its progeny. However, one dan­
ger exists. It is important for other courts to avoid incorporating the 
rational interpretation standard into quotes within this five-part test. 
In order to avoid this dilemma, courts should be careful to limit the 
third inquiry, whether the fabrication is material. l72 Immaterial alter­
ations should apply only to changes in diction and grammar. Any­
thing else should be considered a material alteration, and the 
determination of liability should be a jury question. 
While the majority in Masson improperly advocates a rational in­
terpretation standard, the dissent accurately recommends a "central 
meaning" standard. 173 The altered quote must honestly reflect what 
the speaker said; ifnot, the jury should determine whether the journal­
ist acted with actual malice. In the context of an altered quotation, 
under the central meaning standard, if the speaker's words are ambig­
uous, the statements cannot "be altered to remove the ambiguity be­
167. Id. at 1567. This fabrication involved Masson's discussion of renovating Anna 
Freud's house. Masson said: "it's dark and somber and nothing went on in there. Boy, I 
was going to renovate it and open it up, and the sun would come in and there would be 
people and-Well, that's what it needs, but it is an incredible storehouse. I mean the li­
brary...." Id. 
Malcolm's typed draft stated, "Sun would have come pouring in, people would have 
come, there would have been parties and laughter and fun." This sentence is crossed out, 
and handwriting above it reads, "Maresfield Gardens would have been a center of scholar­
ship, but it would also have been a place of sex, women, fun." Id. This evidence would be 
enough for the jury to infer that the deliberate effort to distort what Masson said was made 
in reckless disregard of the truth. Id. 
168. Id. at 1568-69. 
169. Id. at 1569. 
170. Id. 
171. Id. at 1562. 
172. Id. at 1564. 
173. Id. at 1559 n.12. 
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cause that would change the spirit of what the speaker said."174 In 
contrast, under the rational interpretation standard, the writer is given 
the discretion to choose a rational interpretation of what was actually 
said.17S Because the vast majority of journalists and readers believe 
that a quotation stands for the speaker's verbatim words, the journalist 
should not be given the wide discretion to choose a "rational" inter­
pretation. To prevent this abuse, courts should adopt the dissent's ap­
proach, with the caveat that most substantial changes should be 
viewed as material alterations. Furthermore, unless the altered quota­
tion reflects the central meaning of the speaker's words, the decision of 
liability should rest with the jury. 
CONCLUSION 
The underlying rationale of New York Times and its progeny do 
not support the conclusion that first amendment protection should be 
given to deliberately calculated falsehoods. Neither journalists nor 
proponents of the first amendment can view the decision in Masson as 
a victory, for it casts a shadow of doubt upon the journalist's profes­
sion. The court moved beyond the rationale of New York Times when 
it applied the rational interpretation standard to deliberate misquota­
tions. If Masson becomes the rule, whenever "the reasonable reader" 
encounters a passage containing a quote, there will be some doubt as 
to its accuracy. No reader will ever know when the actual speaker is 
speaking, or when the author, using "rhetorical license," is changing 
the meaning of the speaker's statement. 
The majority's holding is inconsistent with both existing case law 
and, more importantly, with the policies of the first amendment as 
applied to libel law. There is no rational reason why the court should 
have extended first amendment protection to deliberately altered 
quotes. As one journalist noted, the Masson decision "is a case of bad 
journalism making bad law."176 
Maureen E. Walsh 
174. Id. 
175. Id. 
176. Taylor, How Janet Malcolm Won a License to Lie, 15 Conn. L. Tribune, Aug. 
21, 1989, at 22, col. 2. 
